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THE DEBT AS A LEVER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGE.  





Latin America has had repeated debt problems in the 1820’s, 1870’s, 1930’s and in the 
1980’s. All of them have had an external origin that combines portfolio theory of interest 
rates with weak tax revenues. In the 1980’s it was a result of the sudden jump in US interest 
rates  in  1979-81  to  its  highest  historical  record  with  a  simultaneous  depression  of 
commodity prices that strangled the external sector. That external problem became internal 
as the need for fiscal resources and foreign currency for increased debt service led to 
reduced public sector wages and expenditures while foreign exchange policies attempted to 
foster more exports and put a brake on imports while generating inflation. By 1990  the 
entire Latin American economy had been transformed, the domestic market lost ground, the 
wage bill on GDP was reduced, welfare polices were substituted by anti poverty policies 
and  social  commonsense  was  won  over  by  the  IMF/WB  argument  that  the  economy 
required to be totally opened for international financial investment. The Hayekian view 
won over the Keynesian, or better over the Latin American structuralist. This meant the 
demise of the Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and 
the surge of Washington based IFI’s as policy makers. In this article we wish to present 
some comparative elements between the Latin American and the current European debt 
crisis.    
                                                 
1  Lecture  presented  at  the  Eurodad-CADTM  Conference  Debt  and  Austerity:  From  the  Global  South  to 
Europe. U of Athens, 6-8 May 2011 
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The Latin American debt problem. 
 
The economic history of Latin America is plagued with debt crises. (Marichal 1989, 
Eichengreen  1989,  Reinhart  &  Rogoff  2009)  Latin  American  public  debt  became  an 
international problem since the early 1980’s. The debt levels at the time of defaults were in 
the 50% of GDP range. (Reinhart et al., 2003) The reason was that interest rates in the US 
jumped from 6% to 18% between 1976 and 1981 bringing about changes in investment 
portfolios, thus tripping the balance of payments of most countries due to a simultaneous 
reduction in commodity prices.
i Some suggest the real interest rate jumped to 20% (Devlin 
and Ffrench Davies, 1995, 126).  It was an external problem that made its way inside the  
economies.  The  domestic  side  of  the  crisis  was  consumption  growth  using  foreign 
borrowing due to very low international real interest rates  in the mid seventies. (Devlin y 
Ffrench Davies, 1995) The simple liquidity problem, caused by the mixture of the Volcker 
Rule and supply side economics   between 1979 and 1981 , could have been solved by 
consolidating the entire external debt of each country into one very long term bond issue, 
with an international guarantor in 1981-82, much like the 1989 Brady Plan
ii. Instead, at the 
time it was argued, the problem was corruption, ill administration and low productivity. 
The switching of the diagnosis of the debt problem from a balance of payments issue into 
one of rent seeking societies corresponded to the arguments made by A.O. Krueger (1974) 
and taken up by IMF staff.  Using that argument, public debts were rescheduled yearly 
throughout  the  decade   in  an  attempt  to  change  the  economic  policies   through 
conditionality.. 
 
Graph 1. US Prime Rate 
 
 
The recommended solution 
 
The real solution to the Latin American debt problem came when the debt was 
reduced  to  a  manageable  level.  This  could  have  been  done  on  day  one  and  saved  a 
continent from a depression. All debt crises have ended with a reduction of stocks and a 
new issue of consolidated very long term bonds.(Marichal, 2010) The Brady Plan
iii arrived 
in 1989  after a decade of  growing debt, depression, social  pain and  fiscal adjustments. 
Creditors were unwilling to swap FRNs for one bond issue at a major discount as Bresser   5 
Pereira suggested in the early 1980’s. It was when the US Secretary of the Treasury Brady 
put the initiative on the table that it finally worked.  
 
A  global strategy  to achieve this result  was already defined  with precision: it  would combine a 
process of adjustment and reform with a financial mechanism to convert the debt into new securities 
— with lower face value, and submarket interest rates — that would permit the highly indebted 
countries  to  benefit  from  the  discounts  existing  on  the  secondary  market.  This  process  of 
―securitization‖ would apply globally, but would be implemented on a case-by-case basis, according 
to the differing needs of the debtor countries.
iv 
 
The profits for the international banking system that resulted from this strategy were 
two fold.  The increase in the stock of the debt made the lending business very profitable in 
spite that involuntary lending was the only operation. Secondly, the financial benefits of 
privatization and the elimination of the welfare State have served well the international 
financial community. Stock exchanges in Latin America were deregulated and soared since 
1990,  the  banking  industry  as  a  whole  became  transnationalised,  and  private  pension 
schemes were taken over, thus putting in private international hands most domestic savings. 
 
The succession of defaults after 1982 (see Table 1) led to the debt rescheduling 
process which started from 1982 on when debt levels were on average 50% of GDP. The 
IMF  began  doing  the  rounds  once  a  year  through  most  countries  in  the  region  with  
stringent  conditionalities  which  opened  a  downward  spiral  of  public  expenditure  and 
investment,  increased  indirect  taxes  and  gave  way  to  more  IMF  money  to  pay  private 
international bankers and refinance what could not be paid for in the first place while banks 
capitalised accumulated interests in every round. Each refinancing took the unpaid portion 
of the debt and lent new resources with a ten year schedule. By the third refinancing, any 
positive effects a refinancing might have had were lost. Wages fell, the domestic market 
was affected, GDP contracted, debt rose, the debt/GDP ratio grew worse, and then came the 
next round of debt negotiations and IMF conditionality.  
 
Table 1. Debt ratios and default 
 
Debt/GDP  Year of 
 
%  Default 
Argentina  55.1  1982 
Brasil  50.1  1983 
Ecuador  68.2  1984 
México  46.7  1982 
Perú  80.9  1978 
Perú  62  1984 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 
 
If the debtor Government cannot pay X, lending it Y money so it can pay back X 
will  only  lead  to  a  situation  where  the  total  debt  will  grow  from  X  to  X+Y.  The 
rescheduling process in Latin America gave way to a reduced wage bill as a share of GDP 
through IMF conditions of reduced consumption in every turn. It went from an average of 
about 34% to around 28% of GDP with the exceptions of Brazil and Chile where they 
remained stable in the 40% range between 1980 and 2000 and of Costa Rica. (see table 2)   6 
Paraguay did not have a debt problem and Chile reduced its debt in the early 1980’s buying 
it back and Brazil did not exactly follow IMF policies.
v For that reason Omhae (1990) in 
his classic on globalisation said Brazil would never make it to the big leagues.  Contrary to 
his  prediction,  not  following  IMF  policies  allowed  Brazil  to  recover  very  fast  after 
international conditions recovered and some internal reforms were introduced in the 1990’s. 
Most importantly, wages did not fall and the State kept an active role in the economy. For 
example the lading development bank in Brazil remains the BNDES with assets larger than 
the WB and IDB added up in Latin America. 
 
Table 2. Wages/GDP in selected Latin American economies 1980-2010 
Country 
80's  90's  00's 
Average  Std. Dev.  Average  Std. Dev.  Average  Std. Dev. 
Argentina/1  34.6  4.332  39.4  2.938  31.3  5.26 
Bolivia  35.5  0.641  34.5  1.232  32.4  3.726 
Colombia  40.8  2.498  38.8  3.163  33.9  0.987 
Ecuador  23.6  5.32  -  -  -  - 
Honduras  48.6  1.243  43.9  2.786  44.5  0.9 
México  31  3.734  31.5  2.186  30.1  1.735 
Panamá   50.9  3.105  45.2  6.726  33.8  2.685 
Perú  30.1  2.2  25.2  0.83  23.3  1.59 
Venezuela  38.2  3.57  32.7  3.12  31.8  2.17 
Uruguay  35.6  3.06  -  -  -  - 
Chile  36  3.771  37  2.564  38.7  2.392 
Brasil  36.6  2.634  42.2  2.153  40.2  0.661 
Costa Rica  45.7  3.091  49  2.257  -  - 
Jamaica  32.6  0.563  33.9  7.87  41.9  0.715 
Nicaragua  -  -  32.7  1.35  35.3  0.963 
Paraguay  31.5  2.26  32.3  4.33  34.8  2.91 
* GDP at market prices 
/1 Data from Juan Grana (2007) 'Distribución funcional del Ingreso en la Argentina. 1935-2005' 
Taken from SAE (1955); BCRA (1975); Llach y Sánchez (1984); CEPAL (1991)  y EPH-INDEC. 




In every one of the five debt rounds of negotiations during the 1980’s (Devlin and 
Ffrench  Davies,  1995),  IMF  conditions  on  economic  policy  were  placed  targeted  at 
controlling inflation and improving the balance of payments. Lichtensztejn (2010) suggests 
they  failed  as  inflation  grew  worse  due  to  the  devaluatory  policy  and  the  balance  of 
payments positions did not improve significantly. ―Export or die‖ was the dilemma Latin 
Americans had to face. Stabilization policies of the 1980’s were followed by structural 
adjustment  policies  in  the  1990’s  with  the  Brady  Bonds  and  World  Bank  adjustment 
policies. Export led growth was the policy outcome in face of shrinking domestic markets. 
(Ugarteche, 2000) By then international interest rates had returned to a more normal level,   7 
although still high. Prime rates had fallen from 18% to 6% between 1982 and 1989 at 
which point there was  an initial economic policy  agreement known as the Washington 
Consensus
vi  that  consisted  of  getting  rid  of  whatever  welfare  state  elements  existed 
including all subsidies, and liberalized all markets: the banking, credit, financial, exchange 
rate and the labour markets and privatised all Government enterprises. Most of all the aim 
was to reduce the State in Hayek’s spirit.  
 
Protectionism was blamed for the balance of payments problems and for industrial 
inefficiency which led in the first  place to  the  elimination of industrial policies. (A.O. 
Hirshman, 1992) There was no transition between import substitution policies and export 
led policies. No chance was given to export substitution policies in the Asian style. The 
difference was that the Asians did not have a debt problem and did not have to surrender 
their economic policy choices.(Agarwal, 2000)  
 
The purpose of having such a protracted period of adjustments was to change the 
industrialisation  policies  that  had  existed  in  most  countries  since  the  1930’s.  A  ―lost‖ 
1980’s decade later, Latin America’s share of world GDP was halved from 6 to 3%, –
regional GDP annual growth was of - 0.4%–, the public debt jumped from 35% of GDP in 
1980 on average, to over 67% by 1986 and nearly tripled from 129 billion US$ to 320 
billion US$ in current USD throughout the decade. By 1990, a new consensus was created 
that past Keynesian/Structuralist planned import substitution policies were mistaken and 
that the Hayekian free market led to development. Over a decade later, after 2000, South 
American Governments began changes towards strengthening the domestic markets again 
in what some call a swing to the left when realizing that export growth did not bring with it 
either employment nor income distribution.(Vidal, Guillen y Deniz, 2010).  
 
The mechanisms of coercion for economic policy change went through both IMF 
stabilization policies and later World Bank  structural adjustment policies. It was in the 
interest of bankers represented by the US Treasury at the IFIs that the debt be paid as much 
as possible at any cost to the debtor economy while equally pushing for the financialisation 
and opening of the debtor economy.  
 
The point of the Brady Bonds 
 
When debt service had grown as a result of the continuous refinancing and the 
debt/GDP ratio become unsustainable, then, and only then, did Secretary of the Treasury 
Brady suggest that the debt had to be reprogrammed into the very long term and a hair cut 
be taken. These were the Brady bonds which had US Treasury backing in order to reduce 
the risk cost. The counter argument was that changes had to be made in US law so that 
banks could absorb the losses from the debt exposure and this was approved in 1987 only 
(Griffiths Jones, 1988).  
 
The more than doubling of the debt during the 1980’s had two effects: First, the 
debt/GDP  ratio  grew  since  there  was  an  economic  depression  and  the  denominator 
contracted or remained stagnant, while the numerator grew, in spite that no fresh loans were 
granted. Secondly, it opened the issue of ―illegitimacy of the debt‖ since the 190 billion 
dollar difference between the 126 bn US$ original stock of the debt and the 320 USD   8 
billion at the end of the decade was not fresh money entering any country but mainly the 
capitalisation of interest or anatocism.
vii  
 
From a strictly financial point of view, this was not all necessary.  A common sense 
was created that Latin Americans had lived beyond their means. Austerity was the solution 
and that meant reducing the wage bill. Some argued that as the debt had grown quickly in 
the last three years of the 1970’s, it was because Latin Americans were inefficient, corrupt 
and lazy.
viii (Perez Sanchez, 1995) as the Greeks are  also referred to in their crisis.
ix The 
debt level had reached 35% of GDP in 1980, much less than any European economy in 
2010  and  reached  a  peak  of  64.3%  in  1986.  Th ose  debt  levels  were  much  below 
contemporary indices for all of Europe including Great Britain   meaning that the debt 
service problem was more related to cost –interest rates– than to volume.  
 
What triggered the problem in Latin America was the sharp rise in interest rates and 
the shut down of new voluntary credit . Given it was dollar debt, its service depended of 
two things, a balance of payments surplus and primary fiscal surplus. The first two years of 
the crises, international reserves fell by 40% between 1980 and 1982 and imports fell by 
42% between 1981 and 1983 for the region as a whole.  The rate of exchange is what 
connects the one to the other so devaluations meant to foster exports put a break on imports 
and on economic growth. As inflation hit hard as a result of devaluations, the domestic side 
of the economy started to stagnate. Restrictive fiscal policies plus inflationary exchange 
rate policies led to a depression.  
 
The responsibility of that depression lies squarely in the hands of the IMF and the 
international community of the time that never gave up pressure. Once the desired result in 
terms of economic policies was obtained, Secretary of the Treasury Brady announced a 
plan for debt reduction and the emission of long term bonds with US Treasury backing in 
order to reduce interest premiums. The launching of the World Bank’s 1990’s structural 
adjustment policies came hand in hand with export led growth policies and smaller debt 
service. This is what is referred to as the ―export success‖ in balance of payments terms.  
 
The European debt crisis and the HIRC 
 
The  G7  problem  of  overconsumption  comes  together  with  that  of  the  smaller 
European states. (tables 3 and 4) The only G7 country that does not have a serious debt 
problem is Canada that has managed its fiscal policy in order to reduce the debt burden by a 
half from over 70% to 34% between 2000-2010. Very high debt levels precede the systemic 
crisis  of  2007  onwards  and  must  be  seen  as  a  part  of  the  crisis  of  global  capital 
accumulation. It started in the smaller economies but is not limited to those countries as the 
US and Japanese cases show. Most rich economies saw their public and private debt grow 
during  the  first  decade  of  the  XXI  century  with  the  exception  of  the  Scandinavians, 
Switzerland, Austria the Netherlands, and Canada in North America. Iceland is the extreme 
case were private debt grew to 600% of GDP between 2000 and 2007
x. At the beginning of 
the second decade of the century most rich economies are  over indebted if we take the 
Maastricht Treaty 60% public debt/GDP limit criteria as valid and have turned into Highly 
indebted rich countries (HIRC), with low levels of international reserves, bleak growth 
perspectives and a major portion of the national budget assigned to debt payments..    9 
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Table 3. Public debt of leading countries 
% of GDP 
G-7  2000-2005  2006-2010  2010 
Japan  165.3  202.1  225.8 
United States  58.4  74.1  100* 
Great Britain  39.4  56.9  76.5 
Germany  62.8  70.5  78.8 
France  61.2  71.5  83.5 
Italy  106.3  110.3  118.1 
Canada  77.7  75.1  34 
Average  81.6  94.4  102.3 
Source: CIA Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ic.html 
WB, WDI 2010, done by Francisco Josué Martínez Cervantes, OBELA, IIEC UNAM  
*NYT  
 
The European debt problem as a whole appeared after 2007.(Panico, 2010) Most 
EU countries had a public debt ratio of nearly 60% of GDP before the crisis began and 
fiscal spending grew significantly as counterciclycal policies were put in place and bank 
rescues were held at the same time, taking some countries to debt ratios in the 100% and 
over ratio. The basic interest rate for European debt was very low at the start of the crisis 
and then went  even lower, while risk premiums grew.  This has increased their cost of 
borrowing as interest rate risk premiums for those countries with high debt ratios have 
moved away from the average ECB premium.  
 
Table 4. Public debt % GDP  
European Critical Countries 
 
2009  2010 
Belgium  96.2  98.6 
Greece  126.8  144 
Iceland  113.9  123.8 
Ireland  65.5  94.2 
Portugal  76.8  83.2 
Spain  53.2  63.4 
Source. CIA Factbook.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ic.html 
 
The increased cost of the debt due to its risk premium and its size led to the first 
round  of  debt  negotiations  in  what  became  a  ―bailout‖  while  IMF-ECB-EC  economic 
conditions were imposed in order to reduce budget deficits. The result of the first debt 
bailout was an increase of the national debt while the consequence of the budget deficit 
reduction was decreased wages, and public spending thus leading to a decrease in GDP 
growth. This made the debt/GDP ratio larger, much like in Latin America.  
 
   11 
Two years on, some countries – e.g. Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece - have 
entered the second round of debt negotiations and discovered that their basic economic 
indices are worse than at the beginning of the crisis. Looking at the numbers, there is no 
reason for Spain to be included in the list of critical countries and much less given shock 
treatments because its debt level is below the critical point of 60% of GDP. These data 
however does not reflect private debt. 
 
The lesson from Latin America on debt management is that if the stock of the debt 
is not reduced at once, the economic structure will feel the blow, and economic policies 
will be changed. In every debt ―bailout‖ in the short term, additional policy conditions are 
set for disbursement thus leading to long term policy change. As each round of negotiations 
takes  place, the Welfare  State erodes  further, the wage bill  is  reduced further, and the 
economy  becomes  increasingly  privatised,  financialised,  and  with  greater  income 
concentration. The debt is a lever to change economic policies from the Keynesian Welfare 
State to Hayekian policies. 
 
The conditions placed for the European bailouts relate to reduced wages, reduced 
public spending, the privatization of public enterprises and increased indirect taxes. Given 
the European problem is not one of external debt (in another currency) but of domestic debt 
(all in Euros) then all policies are centred on the budget. What was done in Latin America 
in  terms  of  adjustment  through  exchange  rate  policies  and  fiscal  policies  is  done  only 
through  fiscal  policies,  making  the  adjustment  more  difficult.  The  reduction  of  fiscal 
deficits as a first step towards refinancing the debt is a must. The question is how.  
 
The issue however is not one of adjustment but of size of the debt. With 100% debt/ 
GDP ratios, further adjustments will not make the debts more manageable, they will only 
lead to further increased debt ratios with the need for further adjustments and ―bailouts‖. It 
must be kept in mind that this is happening with very low basic interest rates.(table 5)  The 
European debt crisis has started with extremely low interest rates that will necessarily rise 
as inflation and economic activity recover. The question is, how will interest rate increases 
impact  on  European  debt?  Discount  rates  should  grow  significantly  which  added  to 
growing risk premiums will make the problem visible not only for those five countries now 
in the second round of negotiations –Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece– but also 
for those that have not entered yet into any negotiations. 
 
Table 5 . Basic Interest Rates 
Entity and country  rate  Since when 
Bank of Japan 
YEN 
0.10%  19/12/08 
Was reduced to 1% in 1995 
Was further reduced by 0.20% then 
Euro, BCE  1.25%  07/04/11 
increased by 0.25% 
FED US Dollar  0.25%  16/12/08 
Was reduced from 5.25% in March 07 
Further reduced by 1% then 
Bank of England, Pound Sterling  0.50%  05/03/09 
Was reduced from 5% en septiembre del 07 
Further reduced by 1% then 
Source: http://www.housepricecrash.co.uk/graphs-base-rate-uk.php and each country’s central bank. 
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The lesson from Latin America is that growth cannot be restored until debt levels 
are  reduced  to  normal  levels  of  less  than  40%/GDP.  Fiscal  revenue  improves  with 
economic growth and that will help close the fiscal gap if a proper public spending policy is 
in place. This will happen sooner or later, as history has shown in the last two hundred 
years. It can be done if there is political will as the Brady Plan showed. If the object of 
conditionality and debt restructuring is like in Latin America, to change economic policy 
overall, then this will not be possible. If it is to restore some growth, then it is a must.
xi The 
cost of the adjustment cannot be borne only by workers but must also be borne by creditors.  
 
 
Credit institutions and Credit Rating agencies  
 
Historically,  international  sovereign  loans  have  been  done  through  the  London, 
Paris or New York bond markets. The 1930’s changed the instruments in the international 
sovereign lending business. First bilateral loans were introduced during WWI as the US 
Government became the lender of last resort to Governments at war that did not properly 
have control of their own territory. Second, bilateral solutions were found to the debt of 
these  warring  countries  after  the  Versailles  Treaty  in  order  to  allow  them  economic 
recovery. Germany as the losing party was not granted these concessions which led to 
major  inflationary  problems  down  river
xii.  The  debt  solutions  granted  warring  allied 
European countries by the United  States  known as  the  ―inter  allied debt‖ have been a 
onetime process and have not been repeated yet.
xiii Third, after the sovereign bond defaults 
of 1931 were solved with major haircuts more than fifteen years later, the international 
bond  market  shut  complete ly  for  fifty  years .  The  British  Corporation  of  Foreign 
Bondholders founded in 1868 by British bankers went into liquidation in 1988. The 
American  Foreign  Bondholders  Protective  Council  founded  in  1934  by  the  State 
Department is still functioning with its r ecords kept at Stanford University . Fourth, the 
Hoover Year introduced by President Hoover in order to allow European Governments to 
push ten years down debt payments due between July 1, 1931 and June 30, 1932, led to all 
non European Governments to seek the same and enter moratoria without any retaliation. 
Fifth, Bretton Woods multilateral credit agencies were created in 1944 that allowed for the 
financing of the reconstruction and development of Europe and Japan. Sixth a new bilateral 
loan was made to both Germany and allied countries for its recovery called the Marshall 
Plan. International credit to the rest of the world had ceased in 1929 and did not recover 
until the 1950’s. Sixth, a thirty year period of international bank lending began with the 
development of the Euromarket and ended with the crisis of the 1980’s. 
 
After the international banking sovereign debt crisis, bond markets recovered their 
function. ―The sovereign ratings business took off in the late 1980s and early 1990s when 
weaker credits found market conditions sufficiently favourable to issue debt in international 
credit  markets.‖
xiv  Until  then  very  few  countries  had  issued  bonds  in  the  international 
markets after the 1930’s crisis. These were mostly Eastern European countries that did not 
have access to private international bank long term loans due to the trading with the enemy 
act. Instruments such as credit ratings began to operate much like they had when Moody’s 
invented them in the first third of the XXth century except with more complexity. The 
sovereign debt rating manual designed by Euromoney
xv in the early 1980’s and revamped in   13 
2002 is a guide to understanding how economic, social and political elements are taken into 
account in the calculation of credit risk defined as the probability of default on the debt. 
 
Table 6. The Growth of the Sovereign Ratings Business 
Year Rating Was 
First Assigned by 
S&P or Moody’s 
 






Pre 1975  3  AAA/Aaa 
1975- 79  9  AAA/Aaa 
1980-84  3  AAA/Aaa 
1985-89  19  A/A2 
1990-94  15  BBB/Baa3 
Sources: Standard and Poor’s; Moody’s Investors Service. 
From: Richard Cantor and Frank Packer (1995) ―Sovereign Credit Ratings‖, Current Issues 
in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Vol. 1 No. 3, June, pp.1-6 
 http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci1-3.pdf 
 
If credit risk analysis is an important parameter for pricing an asset, it also is an 
instrument used in the transfer of risk from one investor to another. The case of the US 
subprime mortgages is one to be taken into consideration. The three credit rating agencies–
Moody’s, Fitch’s and Standard & Poor’s referred to as NRSRO - a Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization– gave AAA ratings to the subprime mortgages transferred 
from lending banks and financial corporations to investment banks. These in turn packaged 
them into innovative financial vehicles that contained a mix of instruments and risks and 
sold them in the market. When U.S. Congress investigated into how those junk mortgages 
had  passed  from  the  lenders  to  the  end  buyers,  and  how  they  had  been  flogged  into 
customers who had no idea what they were buying, it turned out that the NRSROs had rated 
them  as  highest  quality  financial  instruments  partially  because  they  were  paid  by  the 
lending banks or financial corporations in the first case, and the investment banks in the 
second. They actually emitted an opinion without doing the full work required to classify 
credit  risk.  NRSRO  function  on  the  basis  of  the  ―issuer  pays‖  business  model.  ―The 
agencies  are paid  for their ratings  by the issuers  of the securities and  this  account for 
approximately 90-95% of their annual revenues.‖
xvi This creates a conflict of interest as the 
client that has issued a financial asset asks for an opinion on the financial paper it has 
issued  already  in  order  to  sell  it  in  the  markets.  Their  ―opinion‖  makes  or  breaks  the 
markets. Equally there is lack of independent verification of information and faulty and 
inaccurate quantitative models according to the 2010 US Congress report on credit rating 
agencies.
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Table 7. Rating Symbols for Long-Term Debt 
Interpretation  Moody’s  Standard and Poor’s 
INVESTMENT-GRADE RATINGS     
Highest quality  Aaa  AAA 




















SPECULATIVE- GRADE RATINGS     
















Source: Richard Cantor and Frank Packer (1996), 
―Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings‖ 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/96v02n2/9610cant.pdf 
 
The  role  of  these  three  US  based  NRSRO  in  the  international  sovereign  bond 
markets is major. For example, the timing of the announcements of the rating of sensitive 
countries can affect the markets and result in an influence leading either to over or under 
pricing according to market sentiment on the particular instrument. This element did not 
exist in the 1970’s for bank loans. Banks had their own credit risk analysis and structured 
the cost of the loan according to Libor or Prime rate plus a risk premium. Once it was lent, 
that  was  settled  and  only  the  basic  interest  rate  could  change  in  Floating  Rate  Notes 
(FRNs). Today both the basic interest rate and risk premium can vary making the cost of 
borrowing much more volatile and unpredictable.  
 
For example, there is little evidence that Spain has a major debt problem according 
to the data above, however, once the NRSRO decided that Spain was a problem country, 
then its announcement of its rating immediately upset the cost of borrowing that brought 
with it the ECB IMF conditionality for a ―rescue‖. The Spanish premium jumped from 0 
(Aaa) to 0.75% (Aa2)
xviii. Belgium that has a more severe debt problem than Spain and a 
very complicated political scenario has a  better grading (Aa1)  and was rated  up in July 
2011, in spite of  not having had a Government for over a year. Iceland (Baa3) is doing 
better than Ireland (Ba1) and has a very similar yield curve over the mid 2010 to mid 2011 
period in spite of having defaulted on its debt. The point  made is that apparently NRSRO 
reports affect prices more than the y ought to and that they do not reflect fairness  –an 
independent view– but vested interests.(see yield graphs 3-7 below) 
 
In the 1970’s banks held the loans they made and were responsible for them. In the 
unregulated bond market, no one is responsible for bad loans thus making negotiations 
more complicated. It is investors in bonds that ultimately become responsible for the paper 
they hold. Underwriters pass the risk on completely to their clients with the aid of credit 
rating agencies and credit default swaps.   15 
 
Graph 2. Spain bond yields       Graph 3. Greece bond yields 
              
 
Graph 4 Portugal bond yields   Graph 5 Belgium bond yields 




Graph 6 Ireland bond yields  Graph 7 Iceland bond yields 
                 
Source of all: Bloomberg. Based on 10 year Government bonds 
   
 
Stakeholders 
The Latin American debt of the 1980’s held by international commercial banks, 
denominated in  Floating Rate Notes (FRNs) and denominated in foreign exchange had 
mostly  three  sets  of  actors:  The  London  Club  made  up  of  creditor  banks,  the  debtor 
Government and the IMF. Without an IMF agreement and green light no negotiation was 
possible. 
 
The European debt is more complex. Bond markets have underwriters that issue 
Government instruments. This issue is done with the aiding and abetting of the three credit 
rating agencies that price them. They are sold and buyers, mostly investment banks and 
pension funds, place them with their own customers. Other buyers are commercial banks. 
 
Once issued, bonds take on a life of their own in the derivatives market through 
credit default swaps, bought at the same time just in case the debtor Government is unable 
to meet its payments. Major investors in credit default swaps normally are underwriters and 
insurance firms. Underwriters tend to know the smallest details of the debtor Government 
they are handling, so they can place bets against those debts with the highest knowledge in   16 




Finally, while the Latin  American  debt  problem  of  the  1980’s  was  related  to 
international interest rates, the European debt crisis is related to volume. Basic interest rates 
are in a historical low level at the ECB, and the Bank of England. This suggests that there 
has  been  overconsumption  at  least  from  the  fiscal  sector  side  that  must  be  properly 
financed.  It  also  suggests  problems  with  fiscal  policy.  Some suggest  that  multinational 
firms and wealthy individuals are evading and avoiding paying direct taxes to a significant 
amount
xx and this might be at the root cause of this problem. 
 
This means any solution to the debt problem must also be market based and cannot 
be only an official negotiations exercise as it was in the 1980’s. This leads to buybacks and 
aggressive buybacks. The first are done with the knowledge of the parties involved, the 
second are not. Chile did a buyback in the 1980’s. Argentina and Ecuador did aggressive 
buybacks in 2005 and 2009 respectively. Others Latin countries did the same in 2006.
xxi In 




In  2005,  after  prolonged,  contentious,  and  unsuccessful  attempts  to  find  a  mutually 
acceptable solution to restructuring the debt, Argentina abandoned the negotiation process and made 
a onetime unilateral offer on terms highly unfavorable to creditors. Although 76% of them accepted 
the offer, a diverse group of ―holdouts‖ opted instead for litigation in hopes of achieving a better 
settlement in the future. Argentina still owes private bondholders $20 billion in defaulted debt and 
$10 billion in past-due interest. It is also in arrears to the United States and other governments on 
$6.2 billion in loans.  Although  Argentina  succeeded in reducing  much of its sovereign debt, its 
unorthodox methods have left it ostracized from international credit markets for nearly a decade and 
triggered legislative action and sanctions in the United States. (Hornbeck, 2010: Summary) 
  
In  spite  that  they  also  took  up  private  debt  publicly  guaranteed,  the  act  of  the 
onetime unilateral offer created litigation problems with Argentina which has not been able 
to return to international credit markets and has instead been using peso denominated bond 
issues.
xxiii  In the Ecuadorian case, prices were sent crashing down as news w ere released 
on the likelihood of default due to the conclusion of the debt audit.
xxiv  In aggressive 
buybacks, the issue that remains is that of hold outs, e.g. minority bondholders that decide 
not to exchange their bonds for newer bonds for a much reduced amount. In the Argentine 
case, those holdouts ended up in lawsuits that remain and prevent the normalisation of 
credit. The solution that derived from that case was the introduction of collective action 
clauses (CACs) that force minority bondholders to follow what the majority has agreed 




While Latin sovereign bonds issued in New York have  CACs after the Argentine 
2005 buyback and problem with the minority, it is unclear that European bonds issued in 
London have the same clauses. 
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